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The Empirical Basis of Ethics
What kind of justification can be offered for ethical assertions? Ethical assertions
attribute ethical properties—goodness and evil, justice and injustice, and so on—to actions,
people, or states of affairs. Like most contemporary philosophers, I believe that any time you
assert a property of some concrete object, the only way to justify such an assertion is by appeal
to experience. The experience or experiences on which an assertion is grounded are what I mean
by the “empirical basis” of the assertion.
“Ethics,” in a broad sense, can refer to any inquiry aimed at establishing guidelines for
the conduct of life in general. But I am concerned here with just a branch of ethics so defined. It
seems fair to distinguish two large divisions of ethical thought, which can be traced back to
Cicero’s contrast between “utility” and “duty.” Under the former heading belong all those
considerations that revolve around happiness as a human goal; under the latter, considerations
related to such notions as justice, righteousness, and desert. The division corresponds
approximately to Kant’s distinction between maxims of prudence and commands of morality.1
Maxims of prudence teach us how to pursue happiness; the commands of morality teach us what
we must do in order to deserve to be happy. Kant perhaps formulated the distinction most
clearly, but something like it seems to pervade much of the history of ethics in the west. And the
same or a similar distinction is reflected in ordinary discourse. Most people, I believe, recognize
a difference between saying of something that it is “good” and saying that it is “morally good.”
The adverb seems to acknowledge that there are both moral and non-moral senses of “good.”
Terms like “justice” and “righteousness” seem to carry this moral inflection without need of an
adverb. Accordingly, the second of these branches of ethics might be called the “distinctively
moral” branch. And I can describe the ethical assertions that I wish to focus on here as
“distinctively moral assertions.”
The first feature of distinctively moral assertions, then, is precisely that they are thought
to be different in kind from assertions about happiness and what is productive or destructive of
happiness. We might further specify: this difference in kind is such as to imply that moral
assertions cannot be translated without loss into assertions about happiness, or in more technical
terminology, moral assertions are not reducible to assertions about happiness. Perhaps you are
familiar with G.E. Moore’s defense of the proposition that properties like goodness, in a moral
sense, are “non-natural properties.” In his usage, natural properties were those which were either
recognized by the natural sciences or could be completely explained in terms of properties
recognized by the natural sciences.2 I think that part of the distinctiveness of moral properties
consists in their being non-natural in this sense. Now to say that moral properties cannot be
defined with reference to happiness is not the same thing as to say that they are non-natural. But
I believe that both common usage and philosophical tradition understand moral properties as
radically different from the sorts of things recognized by contemporary natural science. I also
believe that if you are going to construct an ethical theory which rejects non-natural properties,
your best bet will be an ethics of happiness. But there’s no need to defend that claim here. We
1
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can merely stipulate that by “moral assertions” we shall mean assertions not reducible either to
assertions about happiness or to assertions which refer exclusively to natural properties.
Another feature of distinctively moral assertions, as I understand them, is that people who
assert them commonly take them to be true in a straightforward sense. In other words, they take
the properties referred to by moral terminology to be objectively real properties of things. And if
you persuade them that their moral assertions are false, they will understand that to mean that
these properties do not in objective fact belong to the subjects they attributed them to.
In looking into the possibility of justifying ethical assertions, it is specifically moral
assertions as understood in this way that I am interested in—moral assertions understood as
irreducible to considerations of happiness, irreducible to assertions about natural properties, and
attributing objective properties to things. In the terms used in the most recent discussions of this
issue, I want to explore the possibilities for defending non-naturalistic ethical realism.
As you know, one of the dominant schools of philosophy during the 20th century denied
that ethical statements are genuine assertions at all. Philosophers of a positivistic stripe argued
that to call something ‘good,’ ‘right’, and so on was not to attribute a property to it but to express
or recommend certain attitudes toward it. At times it was not clear whether they thought they
were describing ordinary usage or suggesting a radical revision of it. At any rate, as a thesis
about how moral language is actually used, this view seems to have fallen out of favor among
most philosophers. More common today is the kind of theory defended by J.L. Mackie, which
he christened an “error theory” of ethics.3 This kind of theory admits that ethical propositions
are genuine assertions and must therefore be taken as intending to refer to objectively real
properties. But such references fail, because there are no real properties of that ethical sort. This
is the error to which “error theory” points, and it holds all distinctively moral propositions to be
false. Hence another way of describing my project is to say that I want to explore the
possibilities of defending ethical realism against the criticisms of the error theorists.
The issue can be expressed in the form of two simple questions: What empirical
evidence do we have for the truth of some distinctively moral assertions? And, how good is that
evidence?
Just as a point of reference I should say that the ethical propositions in which I am most
interested are those which attribute dignity and worth to persons or ascribe fundamental human
rights to persons. Accordingly, the empirical bases I am most concerned with are the
experiences that ground our beliefs in these sorts of values. But this discussion must proceed at a
somewhat more general level.
The understanding of certain assertions or properties as distinctively moral in the way I
have described is founded, I believe, in a type of experience. To claim that people have
experiences of this sort is not particularly controversial. The experiences are common enough.
The hard question is whether we are justified in taking these experiences as trustworthy, as
providing reliable evidence for what they seem to show us.
Perhaps the best way to describe this sort of experience is by contrasting it to another
sort. For it seems to me that we have experiences corresponding to both sides of the grand
division of ethics that I have been discussing. Sometimes these occur separately, and sometimes
together. They occur together when we find ourselves experiencing the familiar conflict between
what I see as my duty and what I want to do.
I want to be happy. When I see some opportunity for enjoyment, I am moved to realize
that possibility. There are also occasions on which I see a situation as calling on me to take some
3
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action. These seem very different sorts of experience. True, when I feel called on to act in a
certain way, there must be something in me that is capable of feeling and responding to that call.
And this tempts some observers to believe that the experiences are not importantly different, that
in fact everything I do is motivated by a desire for my own satisfaction. And it is quite possible
that some observers feel no such difference between experiences. But many of us, perhaps most
of us, do feel such a difference. Enjoyment of any sort is experienced as, among other things, an
affirmation of the self, and the pursuit of enjoyment is felt as self-assertion. Now when I feel it
incumbent on me to do something, it feels different. The sense is not necessarily one of selfdenial. That description might be appropriate when I am torn between duty and temptation. But
in other cases I might be inclined to describe it as self-assertion of a different sort, or perhaps as
assertion of a different aspect of the self. And even then it differs from the first sort of selfassertion in that it involves a certain kind of deference, a kind of submission to an importance
which transcends me. It may be as simple as responding to someone else’s need for reassurance
or consolation. Or it may be as profound as an act of heroism. In any event, what motivates me
in this second sort of case is a sense of the worthiness of another to be respected or cared for,
independently of any benefit redounding to me, or a sense of the desirability of some state of
affairs independently of any gratification it may bring me. Again, we must admit that if you are
the sort of person you ought to be, there is a kind of gratification in doing what you ought to do.
But we insist that it is gratification of a different sort. Surely the satisfaction of having fulfilled
one’s duty, of having done what was most called for by the situation, is very different from the
ordinary satisfactions of fulfilled desire, whether those desires be animal satisfactions or
distinctively human ambitions. To take a personal example, I sometimes fantasize about being
acclaimed as a great musician—and considering my lack of talent, this requires a generous
amount of imagination—but the joy I would take in such acclaim is a very different sort of thing
than the satisfaction of a job well done or an obligation fulfilled, or the satisfaction of having
performed “above and beyond the call of duty.” The difference is sometimes expressed by
saying that the motivation toward happiness or pleasure is felt as coming from inside the person,
while moral force is felt as confronting one from the outside.
If you reflect on these experiences, I think you will agree that in them, moral values are
experienced as both independent of happiness and as objectively real. Here, if anywhere, we
would expect to find empirical evidence for our moral assertions. But the hard question remains:
Should we regard these experiences as providing us with evidence of the existence of such
values? Should we ever regard such experiences as revealing to us some truth?
Many people who are skeptical about moral truths regard some non-moral propositions,
particularly scientific propositions, as unobjectionable. They fault moral assertions precisely for
failing to live up to the standards of scientific evidence. This is something that both oldfashioned positivists and modern error theorists tend to have in common. There are some
philosophers, of course, who embrace a more global skepticism, or as they might prefer to call it,
anti-realism. For present purposes, I am just going to assume that they are wrong, that our
scientific beliefs and the general run of beliefs based on sense-perception stand on pretty firm
foundations. A common strategy used in defending ethical beliefs is to show that they do not
differ as much as they seem to from these admittedly reliable sorts of belief. This strategy seems
to become more persuasive as we begin to understand that the grounds of these other sorts of
belief are not as straightforward as we once thought. At this point, some brief remarks about the
philosophy of knowledge are in order.

4
Once upon a time it was believed that a science, understood as a body of knowledge, had
to be founded on either or both of (a) general principles which were necessarily true, and whose
necessary truth was self-evident to reason, or (b) direct observations of individual facts,
observations which, in the ideal, would be incorrigible. In either event, the idea was that science
could be certain, because our routes of access to its foundations were infallible. This view of
science has now been generally abandoned. Some philosophers deny that any truths are selfevidently necessary. Others continue to believe that some truths, for which the prime candidates
are certain logical and mathematical propositions, are necessary and in some sense knowable a
priori (independently of experience). But hardly anyone, if anyone, maintains that the domain of
necessary truths can be enlarged to include other principles fundamental to our knowledge of the
world. Most of us still accept some version of the Logical Positivists’ principle that knowledge
of the world outside our minds must be fundamentally empirical. At the same time, the second
of the proposed bases of certainty has likewise fallen out of favor. The attempt to identify
observations which were both incorrigible and rich enough to solidly ground what we think we
know about the world—this attempt quickly foundered. The lesson most philosophers have
drawn from these developments is that none of our capacities for establishing foundations for
knowledge can be considered infallible. All of our “starting points” are in principle subject to
revision. The method of science is at heart that which John Rawls, with reference to ethics,
dubbed the method of “reflective equilibrium.”4 We progress by comparing our general
principles with specific observations, and adjusting both our principles and our reports of our
observations until the two cohere with each other. New observations and further reflection on
principles can prompt us to repeat the process. On this understanding of science, a report of an
observation is a description of an experience which is provisionally taken to be reliable. Neither
the experience nor the linguistic description of it is considered a bare datum; not only do our
theories depend on observation, observation conversely is theory-dependent. The content of
your experience is determined in part by the expectations and beliefs you bring to it. Neither our
scientific principles nor our observations are, so to speak, “pure,” each being “contaminated” to
some extent by the other. What makes an observation an observation, however, is that the
proposition for which it is most immediately taken to provide evidence arises directly from the
experience itself, rather than being consciously inferred from it. I believe that the book is on the
desk because I see that the book is on the desk, and the “because” here does not represent an
inference. At the same time, we must recognize that my ability to see that the book is on the
desk results from a learning process in which innate programs of cognitive development have
been actuated and informed by previous experiences. We might say that to really see that the
book is on the desk requires that I previously be in possession of the concepts ‘book’ and ‘desk,’
and a grasp of spatial relations. But to speak of concepts tempts one to regard the whole thing as
more intellectual or more conscious than it actually is.
In philosophical usage, the term ‘intuition’ generally refers to an experience which, to the
experiencer, appears to be a direct awareness of some reality or an immediate apprehension of
the truth of some proposition. Intuitions, like sense-perceptions, may well be the end-product of
certain processes, but we are not conscious of these processes; we are conscious only of their
results. Ethical intuitions fit this description. In the past, the term was sometimes used for an
allegedly direct insight into the truth of general ethical principles. Contemporary ethicists tend
to restrict it to experiences of individual ethical facts, which can then, of course, be taken up into
the method of reflective equilibrium and used as bases for establishing general principles.
4
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If we take ethical intuitions as our “observations” for the purpose of doing ethics, and we
view the method of reflective equilibrium as the appropriate way to achieve progress in the
science of ethics, what differences will this make in how we think of these intuitions? In
particular, what difference will it make in our judgments of their reliability?
We should start by noting some peculiarities of ethical intuitions. They are in one way
more complex than many others. From the content of an ethical intuition we can abstract an
ethically neutral description of the act or object being judged, and thus distinguish it from the
moral property attributed to it. Recognizing an act as, say, an instance of unjustified harm
presupposes recognizing it as an instance of harm. In the current terminology, ethical properties
“supervene” on the natural properties of things. There is disagreement about just what this
relation of supervenience is, but we need not settle that issue here. In the experience of intuition,
recognition of what one passes judgment on and recognition of what judgment is called for may
not be readily separable. But it is clear at any rate that one can contrive an ethically neutral
description of a situation, and we can then explore our ethical intuitions as responses to these
hypothetical facts. Indeed, much of ethical argument and the teaching of ethics consists in
presenting people with such cases and drawing out their responses. This is a reason why history
and literature are so useful in such discussions. Our “experiments” in ethics are more often like
thought experiments than like laboratory experiments. This feature may increase the uncertainty
of our ethical intuitions. Our intuition in a hypothetical case might not coincide with the
intuition we would have when confronted with an actual case fitting the same description. At the
same time, however, hypothetical cases may tend to make our observations more trustworthy by
insulating our intuitions from irrelevant influences like biases of attention and interest and from
constraints of time and urgency which are often present in actual situations where judgment and
decision are called for.
Now let us turn to some points on which ethical intuitions are similar to other intuitions
or observations. First, a single experience, or a set of experiences that are generically the same,
can be subject to multiple descriptions, some of them incompatible with others. We know that
different witnesses to a single event may supply different and in some respects contradictory
reports of what happened. Besides elements of interpretation and perspective that influence the
experience itself, there is further room for interpretation when we reflect on and describe the
experience. This is perhaps most clearly evident when one’s reaction to a situation is considered
part of the experience to be reported. Thus, one poem may seem to us to capture the essence of
an emotion, or of the mood of an action or event, much better than another. And readers may
disagree about who does the better job. Here it is not a matter of discriminating simply true from
simply false reports, but of distinguishing more or less accurate, more or less complete
descriptions. For a simple example, consider our reaction to a minor accidental injury. When I
stub my toe on a table leg, I get mad. What precisely is involved in this emotion? Am I in some
sense “blaming” the table for hurting me? Blaming the gods for not preventing this accident?
Why do I curse when this happens, and on what or whom am I calling down damnation? Finally,
what role should my answers to these questions play when I try to describe the experience?
Shall I just say, “I stubbed my toe,” and let you imagine the rest, on the assumption that you
know what it’s like because it has happened to you? What about people who have trained
themselves into reverse cursing? Instead of saying “God damn it” they say “God bless it.” Do
they have the same experience and merely interpret it differently, or is the experience itself
somehow different?
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Similar ambiguities attach to ethical intuitions. Two persons may agree in morally
condemning an action, but one may describe it by saying “I saw that unjustified injury was being
done,” another that “I saw that the victim’s rights were being violated,” another that “The agent
failed to show the respect due to rational agents,” another that “The agent was deficient in
compassion.” A consequentialist may say “I saw someone committing an act which produced a
net deficit of good consequences.” An emotivist may say “I witnessed an act of the sort which
evokes a negative emotion in me.” We could conclude that these variations merely demonstrate
that our judgments are “theory-laden.” But turn that around and you will be saying that one of
the differences among ethical theories is precisely that they prefer different descriptions of what
might be in some sense the same observed fact. When descriptions of an observation differ, how
are we to decide which is correct? We may well find ourselves in a situation where some
observers claim to see something in an experience that others do not see. Whose reports are to
be believed?
Second, insofar as observations are theory-laden or dependent on expectations or prior
knowledge, their accuracy and reliability tend to depend on how far the observer has mastered
the theory or acquired the relevant art, or how wide and diverse a range of experiences the
observer has had previously. When it comes to judging wines, or horses, or athletes—or
teachers—an experienced observer is more trustworthy than a novice. Contemporary culture has
an ambivalent attitude toward experts, sometimes relying on them completely and sometimes
completely rejecting their authority. Expertise is so anti-democratic, so un-egalitarian. But
surely we must admit that in many matters, some people are better observers than others. Why
wouldn’t this be as true of ethical intuitions as of any other observations? But if it is, how do
we recognize which ethical observers are the better ones?
Third, while a sufficiently wide experience by itself can turn a person into an expert or a
connoisseur, it’s much more expedient, and you are likely to advance much further in the end, if
you learn your art or science under the tutelage of others who already have the knack. One
thinks of the benefits of doing rounds with an experienced doctor, or playing football under an
experienced coach. And as a rule, the best tutors have had tutors of their own, who in turn had
theirs, who in turn had theirs, and so on. There are traditions of observation and judgment which
are passed on from teacher to pupil through generations. One might refer here to the claim made
by some defenders of virtue ethics (but only some, for they are a motley crew) that there are
truths about the virtues that are only available to people who have had the right sort of
upbringing. Whatever you think of this, it does seem to be the case that accurate observation
often depends on enculturation into a tradition. This raises concerns about the trustworthiness of
various traditions, and consequently about the observations made within those traditions. This
problem, too, is not peculiar to ethics. Your chemistry teacher leans on a tradition no less than
your ethics instructor.
If our beliefs depend ultimately on observations, and no observation is pure or infallible,
then the question of justification is modified. It now becomes: Which observations is it
appropriate to take as provisionally reliable, and how far should we rely on them—that is, how
reluctant should we be to discredit them as a result of reflection? Practically speaking, what we
take for our starting points are whatever intuitions and beliefs we happen to have at a given time.
We provisionally accept them as true and then go on to compare them to each other, perhaps
gathering additional intuitions and beliefs in the process. This is what the method of reflective
equilibrium involves. As a result of these reflections, we come to regard some of our previous
intuitions or beliefs as unreliable. Even the scientifically naïve person goes through some such
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process with respect to sense-perception. We have learned to recognize a number of ways in
which our senses are deceiving. Most of us do not proceed from there to a global skepticism
about sensation. Instead, we look for ways of guarding against deception, while regarding most
observations as tolerably reliable, especially if monitored for evidence of possible deceptions.
Our operating principle seems to be “Take things to be as they appear to be, unless you have
good reason for suspecting otherwise.” Shouldn’t the same sort of principle govern our
treatment of ethical intuitions?
I suppose an error theorist would answer: “Even if we do accept this principle, it won’t
help to justify ethical assertions, because we do have good reasons for thinking our ethical
intuitions unreliable. In fact, we have good reasons for supposing that they are all deceptive and
that all our ethical assertions are therefore false.” What are these allegedly good reasons? I turn
again to J.L. Mackie, who offers a concise summary of them.5
The first is the argument from relativism. As Mackie characterizes it, this argument starts
from the fact that moral codes vary in important ways from culture to culture, and then claims
that these variations are much more plausibly explained by the hypothesis that these codes
emerge primarily from the distinctive, historically developed ways of life of a culture than by the
hypothesis that they represent different cultures’ conflicting perceptions of some common and
objective truths. Older versions of this argument have been thoroughly criticized and, to my
mind, effectively undermined.6 Does Mackie’s version introduce something new? If so, it must
consist in the appeal to the notion that one hypothesis offers a better explanation than the other.
But the notion of a better or more plausible explanation is, in the most important cases, not one
for which we can provide hard and fast criteria of application. I suspect that the apparent
plausibility of many versions of the argument from relativism, including Mackie’s, depends on
our accepting the same sort of assumptions that underlie the other argument against ethical
realism. So I will focus my attention on that argument.
This other argument is what Mackie calls the “argument from queerness.” He divides it
into two parts which are really two independent arguments; he lumps them together because both
their conclusions can be described by saying that we should reject objectively real moral
properties because they are very strange sorts of things. The first argument raises a metaphysical
objection; it points out that moral properties are radically different from the other properties we
recognize in the world. They fundamentally differ in kind both from properties we perceive via
sensation and from theoretical properties which we postulate to explain sensible properties.
They are sui generis, and that makes them at least suspect. They seem to belong in the same
category as discredited phenomena like ghosts, witchcraft, telekinesis, and fortune-telling.
Mackie does not explicitly affirm that only naturalistic properties could be real, but such an
assumption seems to hover nearby.
The second argument from queerness makes an epistemological point: that the generally
recognized modes of perception and reasoning, and the established methods of finding the truth,
do not include any which would give us access to the sorts of properties in question. As he puts
it, every moral realist must ultimately fall back on an appeal to intuition, and it is not clear what
this alleged mode of knowing is or whether anything we might point to with this term can be
considered a source of knowledge.
5
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Here is a problem with this argument. The methodology of both the natural and the
social sciences requires that these disciplines be, to revive an older term, “value-free.” The term
has passed out of use in part because critics have argued that the sciences often, or for some
critics necessarily, fail to live up to that ideal. Another reason is that we came to realize that the
criteria by which we judge scientific theories include scientific values such as simplicity and
potential for future research, and that the criteria by which we judge scientists include “ethical”
values like deference to the community of scholars, honesty in reporting one’s results, and
allegiance to scientific methodology. In sum, there are values which are integral to the practice
of science itself. Some critics have gone so far as to depict science as just another self-justifying
and self-serving ideology. But even those who have stopped short of so radical a conclusion
have sometimes lost sight of the element of truth in the claim that sciences can be value-free.
Both natural and social sciences try to establish how things are, rather than how they ought to be.
Or if that distinction is too strong for you, we should at least admit that they try to set ethical
judgments about their subject matters to one side, and establish non-moral facts about them.
Even where the object of study is the sociology or psychology of ethical values, the job of the
social scientist qua scientist is not to pass moral judgment on the morality being studied, but to
accurately depict what it is. The moral psychologist is looking for non-moral, “purely factual”
truths about moral beliefs, attitudes, and emotions. The scientist sets aside the issue of the truth
or falsity of value judgments in investigating their psychological causes and effects. A scientist
who proposed to integrate properties like goodness, rightness, and justice into his or her theories
other than as objects of human belief would surely be told that he or she was no longer doing
science.
From the viewpoint of a believer in the objective reality of moral values, the natural or
social scientist abstracts from the moral dimensions of the subject matter, and does so for
perfectly good reasons. But the scientist, qua scientist, need not deny the existence of those
dimensions. In the eyes of the moral skeptic, by contrast, what the scientist is setting aside is not
some real aspects of the objects being studied, but fictions, illusory properties. To justify this
interpretation of the process, the skeptic appeals to the fact that scientific explanations do not
invoke real moral properties. In effect, the skeptic argues that because a method which precludes
the recognition of moral facts yields results in which no moral facts are appealed to, we are
justified in concluding that there are no moral facts. In other words, the skeptic assumes from
the outset that the “value-free” approach is the only route to reality.
So my first criticism of the arguments from queerness is that they essentially beg the
question. Here’s another way of putting the point. I have at least provisionally accepted the
principle, “Take things as they appear to be, unless you have good reason for suspecting
otherwise.” Now to have a good reason for suspicion is to have a good reason for doubting the
conclusions arrived at by the “mode of appearing” under scrutiny. But the fact that some muchrelied-on method of investigation which bars appeal to moral intuitions fails to establish moral
facts is not in itself a reason to doubt these alleged facts. To get that conclusion we would have
to add that the much-relied-on method is the only reliable method worth relying on. But if we do
that, then we are presupposing that moral intuitions are unreliable.
Now here’s a reply on behalf of the error theorist: “I am not presupposing that value-free
methods provide the only route to reliable conclusions. I am assuming that the methods of the
sciences are reliable. And I can defend this conclusion. First, there is the predictive success of
scientific theories. Since moral theories aren’t concerned with prediction, they find no footing
here. Second, scientific investigation of the cognitive processes which underlie scientific
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investigation, including especially the processes of observation, yields an account of these
processes which explains both their successes and their failures. For example, studies of visual
perception yield explanations of both trustworthy perceptions and optical illusions, and help us to
discriminate between the two. We have no comparable accounts of ethical intuition. Third, the
principle that we should trust the appearances except where we have reason not to is itself on
much firmer ground when applied to scientific observations than when applied to ethical
intuitions. When all is said and done, the fact remains that scientific theories rely heavily on
sense-perceptions, and we must rely on sense-perceptions if we are to have any substantive
theories at all.7 No parallel argument can be made for moral realism. We don’t have to assume
it for theoretical purposes, nor is it required for practical purposes. We can get by quite well
with a naturalistic ethics consisting of maxims of prudence and dispensing with your
distinctively moral notions. I conclude that we can now presume the reliability of scientific
observations, but in the case of ethical intuitions, the burden of proof lies on the realist.”
What can we say to this? First, I think we should concede the point about predictions. If
ethical assertions can be used to make predictions, I assume that confirming those predictions
would depend on ethical intuitions, so no relief is to be sought there. As for the second point,
defenders of ethical intuition are in a much better position now than they were just a few years
ago. Over the last two decades, psychologists as well as philosophers have increasingly turned
their attention to moral psychology, and a great deal of research has been generated on intuition
generally and moral intuition in particular.8 This research has included both empirical studies
and efforts at conceptual clarification, and they have ranged from clinical studies of how
variations in the details of a situation or in how the situation is described affect people’s moral
intuitions or judgments, to physiological accounts of the neural bases of moral reactions, based
on brain-imaging techniques. No longer are we reduced to using the term “intuition” for weknow-not-what process of arriving at belief. There is not yet a standard, widely-accepted
account of intuition. Varying definitions of the term, and other terms referring to similar if not
the same processes are deployed in the literature. Many questions remain to be answered and
much research to be done. But we already know more than ever before about how intuitive
judgments can be biased by irrelevant factors, and about circumstances in which intuitive
judgments are more apt to succeed than carefully reasoned ones. The latter was the theme of
Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink,9 and research on so-called mental “heuristics” has contributed to both
topics. Antonio Dammasio’s work on the role of emotion in decision-making belongs in the
same category.10 We seem to be well on the way to constructing a scientific account of the
processes which lead to intuitive judgments which should help us to discriminate more
successfully between reliable and unreliable intuitions.
The fact remains, however, that purely psychological studies in the moral realm continue
to approach this issue with a deliberately neutral attitude toward the truth of our intuitive
judgments. We continue to assume that the opposite approach would introduce ideological bias
into our investigations. Consequently, our psychological researches can help us monitor the
7
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reliability of our intuitions when they lead us to conclusions about morally neutral facts, but they
cannot test some of our moral intuitions by comparison with others whose reliability can be
taken for granted, even provisionally. Or if they do this, then they will also thereby have
provisionally granted the truth of moral realism. And then we won’t be able to use the results of
their researches as evidence for moral realism, or the skeptic will justifiably accuse us of begging
the question. In sum, such developments have made moral intuitions much less “queer” than
they formerly seemed to be, but they have not settled the issue of their reliability.
The third point I attributed to my error theorist is that the principle “Take things to be as
they seem unless there is good reason to think otherwise” is well-nigh indispensable in commonsense and scientific contexts, if we are to claim objective knowledge at all. But it is far from
clear that it is even a good principle to follow, much less an indispensable one, in the context of
morality. The best evidence for moral realism is our moral intuitions. If we place all of those in
doubt, we have nowhere else to go for evidence of their reliability. We seem to be still in the
situation depicted by William Frankena in 1939: We have a disagreement between people who
insist that the moral content of their intuitions represents something real, and people who claim
that that content is merely a product of subjective, non-truth-producing mental processes. And
the very nature of the agreement leaves us with little or no ground for resolving it by appeal to
the evidence. 11 How then are we to resolve it?
If we should come to believe that even adequate scientific theories require us to postulate
values of some sort, not just to be guided by certain values in the practice of science, but to assert
the objective reality of certain values, and if these values at least bore some analogy to ethical
values if not simply being ethical values, that would essentially eliminate the queerness of
morality. From late antiquity through the Renaissance, most philosophers in the European
tradition accepted an essentially Platonistic metaphysics which sanctioned just such an infusion
of values into science. But there seems little prospect of reviving such an approach at present.
These days, if you want people to stop taking you seriously, just tell them you’re a Platonist.
Here’s what I think is feasible. Those of us who are deeply committed to the reality of
moral values can reflect on the experiences which seem to us to corroborate them, on the range
and variety of these experiences, and on their mutual coherence. We can reflect as well on past
efforts to articulate these intuitions and work them up into ethical theories. From all this we can
attempt to extract strategies for teaching others to see what we see. In the end, however, I think
the ability to believe what one intuits depends on a willingness to believe it. In other words, it
depends on something like an act of faith. Even the scientist’s trust in empirical evidence could
be said to constitute an act of faith, although it is one we can refrain from only with difficulty,
and only imperfectly. The moral act of faith requires a bit more of a “leap,” but it is still
considerably more modest, it seems to me, than the act of faith that undergirds a revealed
religion. In a famous lecture, William James offered a defense of such acts of faith with respect
to what he saw as the core of religious belief.12 That core of belief was far short of the elaborate
constructions of theology. In the final analysis it may not be much removed from what I have
called distinctively moral beliefs. At any rate, I believe something like his argument applies
even more straightforwardly to faith in our moral intuitions. As he looked at it, such faith
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represents a gamble, but if you decide that the risk is worth taking, you cannot be faulted on
intellectual grounds. I am inclined to draw the same conclusion about moral assertions.
This is not the result one would have hoped for. I would much have preferred to come
upon an unanswerable demonstration of the reality of distinctively moral values, of the truth of
some distinctively moral assertions. Nonetheless, I think that what I have said is true.
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